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This survey focuses on significant changes in family law made
by the Montana Supreme Court in 1981. The survey considers the
division of a military pension and evaluation of tax consequences
in a marital property division, the effect of a voluntary change in
circumstances on support decrees, a redefinition of "reasonable vis-
itation" rights, the constitutionality of blood tests and the statute
of limitations in a paternity suit, and the need for district courts to
draft their own findings of fact.
I. PROPERTY DIVISION
A. Military Pensions
Two Montana Supreme Court cases, Miller v. Miller' and
Karr v. Karr,' were appealed to the United States Supreme Court
and considered in light of a recent landmark United States Su-
preme Court decision, McCarty v. McCarty.8 Miller, Karr and Mc-
Carty all involved the issue of whether a district court should in-
clude the value of a spouse's military retirement pension when
making a property division. In reviewing these cases and their
holdings, it is important to understand when they were decided by
the various courts. The following chronology should be kept in
mind:
March 27, 1980 Miller decided by Montana Supreme
Court;
April 1, 1981 Karr decided by the Montana Supreme
Court;
June 26, 1981 McCarty decided by the United States
Supreme Court;
June 30, 1981 Miller decided by the United States Su-
preme Court;
Pending Karr decision by the United States Su-
preme Court.
McCarty, originally a California case, held that the value of a
1. - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1185 (1980), vacated, 49 U.S.L.W. 3978 (U.S. June 30, 1981)
(No. 80-291).
2. - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 267 (1981), petition for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3113 (U.S.
Aug. 24, 1981) (No. 81-363).
3. 101 S. Ct. 2728 (1981) (at time of publication, U.S. cite available at 453 U.S. 210
(1981)). 1
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military pension cannot be considered part of the marital property
and therefore the pension cannot be divided.' The United States
Supreme Court reasoned that division of a federal pension by a
state court defeated Congress' goals for the military retirement
program.5 Justice Blackmun wrote:
Congress has determined that a youthful military is essential to
the national defense; it is not for a State to interfere with that
goal by lessening the incentive to retire created by the military
retirement system .. . .Congress may well decide, as it has in
the Civil Service and Foreign Service contexts, that more protec-
tion should be afforded a former spouse of a retired service mem-
ber. This decision, however, is for Congress alone.'
The Court strongly implied that this non-division rule applies to
common law property states like Montana.'
McCarty is a landmark case because it follows on the heels of
a prior United States Supreme Court case,8 which involved federal
pensions created by the federal Railroad Retirement Act. In this
earlier case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, the United States Supreme
Court excluded the value of the railroad pension from the marital
property valuation because inclusion would do major damage to
clear and substantial federal interests.'
In Miller v. Miller, the Montana district court awarded the
wife 38.5 percent of the husband's military pension. 10 The Mon-
4. Id. at 2730.
5. Id. at 2742. Those goals are to induce enlistment, create career paths, ensure a
young militia, and provide for the retirement needs of service personnel.
6. Id. at 2742-43. According to the Billings Gazette, several bills are pending in the
U.S. House of Representatives which would allow ex-spouses of military personnel to receive
money from the divorce directly. One bill would allow the alimony or child support to be
sent directly to the ex-spouse. Another bill would divide retirement pay between those di-
vorced military spouses whose marriages lasted at least ten years. A third bill would give the
ex-spouse medical benefits. Billings Gazette, July 9, 1981, at B3, col. 1-5.
7. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2741-42: "Indeed, at least one court (in a noncommunity
property state) has gone so far as to hold that the heirs of the ex-spouse may even inherit
her interest in military pay. See In re Miller, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1185 (1980), cert.
pending sub nom. Miller v. Miller, No. 81-291. Clearly, '[t]he law of the State is not compe-
tent to do this.' McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. at 389." California is a community property law
state in which all property earned by either spouse during the marriage is treated as com-
munity property. The pension in McCarty was held to be quasi-community property. Each
spouse is entitled to a one-half interest in all community and quasi-community property.
McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2733. Montana is a common law property state in which division of
the property depends on a totality of circumstances as contemplated by the Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act [hereinafter cited as UMDA found in the MONTANA CODE ANNOTATED
[hereinafter cited as MCA] §§ 40-1-101 through -404 and §§ 40-4-101 through -221 (1981).
8. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
9. McCarty, 101 S. Ct. at 2735.
10. - Mont. -. 609 P.2d at 1185.
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tana Supreme Court upheld this decision, and the husband ap-
pealed to the United States Supreme Court. The United States Su-
preme Court reversed the Montana Supreme Court, holding, as in
McCarty, that the military pension could not be divided."
In Karr, the district court considered the husband's military
pension as future income but did not award a specific part of it to
the wife. An important distinction must be made between taking
the pension into consideration and actually awarding a portion of
the pension. The Montana Supreme Court, relying on prior Mon-
tana case law, confirmed the district court's decision." Quoting
from the district court's record, the supreme court declared:
While a pension cannot be included in the marital property or
used as a set-off, it can be considered as a source of income in
arriving at an equitable apportionment required by the statute,
just as it may be used in determining alimony or maintenance
.... The federal law may hold our wrist from reaching into [the
husband's] retirement salary, but it need not blind our eyes to the
reality of the situation.'
The United States Supreme Court will probably affirm Karr
because the district court did not specifically award a part of the
military pension to the ex-spouse."'3' This draws a fine judicial line
between permissible and impermissible dispositions of federal mili-
tary pensions. After McCarty, Miller and Karr, property divisions
that specifically award a part of the pension to the spouse will not
be upheld, according to McCarty and Miller; dispositions that do
not split the pension but consider it as future income will be up-
held, according to Karr.
B. Tax Consequences
In Gilbert v. Gilbert'4 and Beck v. Beck,"5 the Montana Su-
preme Court held that "concrete" but not "theoretical" tax conse-
11. Miller, 49 U.S.L.W. 3978 (U.S. June 30, 1981) (No. 80-291).
12. The district court divided the estate in a 2:1 ratio in the wife's favor and awarded
her $190,926 in a lump sum because adequate marital real property existed and because the
husband was uncooperative throughout the dissolution proceeding. Karr, - Mont. -. , 628
P.2d at 276 (citing Miller, - Mont. -, 609 P.2d 1185 (1980); McGill v. McGill, - Mont.
-, 609 P.2d 278 (1980)). McGill was reheard by the Montana Supreme Court and was
reversed for exclusion of the military pension in accordance with McCarty. McGill v. Mc-
Gill, - Mont. -, 637 P.2d 1182 (1981).
13. Karr, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d at 272.
13.1. At the time of publication the United States Supreme Court had denied certio-
rari, thereby impliedly affirming Karr. 50 U.S.L.W. 3757 (U.S. March 23, 1982).
14. Gilbert v. Gilbert, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 1088 (1981).
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quences of a marital property division must be considered by the
district courts. Although the supreme court did not define "theo-
retical" or "concrete and immediate" tax consequences, working
definitions can be inferred from the facts of the two cases.
In Gilbert, the district court and the husband drafted two
widely differing valuations of the net marital estate. The husband,
in his valuation, included the estimated tax consequences of liqui-
dating his retirement program. The district court refused to con-
sider the tax consequences; consequently, the husband appealed on
the basis that the district court abused its discretion by not consid-
ering the tax effects of the liquidation. 16 The Montana Supreme
Court held that the effects were "neither necessary nor probable,
but merely conjectural,' 1 7 and thus the court did not abuse its
discretion.
In Beck, prior to the marriage dissolution, the husband and
wife assigned their contract proceeds from a sale of real estate to
two banks as security for their unspecified debts."8 The district
court included the contract proceeds in the marital estate valua-
tion, but the resulting tax consequences of a division of the pro-
ceeds were not considered. On appeal, the Montana Supreme
Court held that the tax consequences were concrete and adverse
and therefore must be considered by the district court before final
judgment is rendered.'9 The supreme court cited to Gilbert as a
comparison between "concrete" and "theoretical" tax conse-
quences, but the court did not define either term.20
Following Gilbert and Beck, district courts must therefore first
decide whether tax consequences of a marital property division are
concrete or theoretical before dividing the property. If the tax con-
sequences are concrete, the property division should take them
into account.
II. MODIFICATION OF DISSOLUTION DECREES
A. Voluntary Change in Circumstances
Many jurisdictions will consider a non-custodial parent's vol-
untary change in circumstances as one factor in deciding whether
to modify a child support or maintenance decree.2 ' Other jurisdic-
tions refuse to consider voluntary changes. Montana followed those
16. Gilbert, - Mont. -, 628 P.2d at 1089.
17. Id.
18. Beck, - Mont. -, 631 P.2d at 283.
19. These consequences were not detailed in the opinion.
20. Beck, - Mont. -, 631 P.2d at 285.
21. Rome v. Rome, - Mont. -, 621 P.2d 1090 (1981).
320 [Vol. 43
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jurisdictions that consider voluntary changes as a factor in Rome v.
Rome22 and Tidball v. Tidball1.28
The husband in Rome remarried and switched jobs from the
hardware business to the logging industry and alleged that he
could not continue child support payments of $200 per month.2 ' In
denying the petition to modify those payments, the district court
held that voluntary changes could not be considered. The district
court reasoned that the petitioner voluntarily assumed the obliga-
tions of a second family and changed jobs, knowing he still owed a
duty to support his first two children.25 Further, the district court
found that the changes made were insufficient and did not sub-
stantially affect his ability to pay.2'
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court held that a voluntary
change in circumstances should be considered in modifying child
support. Failure to do so, in the court's words, is "an inflexible ap-
proach [that] is too harsh."2
In supporting its decision, the supreme court relied on an Ore-
gon case, Nelson v. Nelson,28 but failed to employ Nelson's pri-
mary criterion, whether the voluntary change in circumstances was
made in "good faith." Nelson held that support payments cannot
be changed when a petitioner voluntarily acts in bad faith to
worsen his financial condition, thereby "jeopardiz[ing] his child's
interests. ' 29 However, the Oregon Supreme Court recognized that a
refusal to consider a voluntary change as a factor would freeze the
petitioner in one occupation or circumstance unless he was willing
to suffer financial hardship.30 The Oregon court reasoned:
The fact that such financial hardship is brought about through
the father's change in employment, even though made with
knowledge that it 'vill result in a reduction of his financial re-
sources, does not preclude the court from considering the change
as a basis for a modification of the decree. The change must, of
course, be made in good faith."1
22. Id.
23. - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 1147 (1981).




28. 225 Or. 257, 357 P.2d 536 (1960).
29. Id. at 261, 357 P.2d at 538. See also Annot., 89 A.L.R. 2d 57 (1963).
30. Nelson, 225 Or. at 262, 357 P.2d at 539.
31. Id. at 263, 357 P.2d at 539. The Nelson case was later cited in a 1981 Illinois case,
Coons v. Wilder, - Ill. App. 3d -, 415 N.E.2d 785 (1981), as perpetuating the "good
faith" test. The father in Coons contended that child support payments should be reduced
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In Tidball v. Tidbal, the Montana district court ordered the
husband to pay maintenance so that the wife would not have to
seek outside employment and could take care of their mentally in-
competent child.82 The husband later petitioned the district court
to eliminate his maintenance duty when he found out that the wife
was employed as a teacher in Arizona.83 When the wife learned
about the petition, she quit her job, ostensibly to spend more time
with their child, but possibly to avoid losing the maintenance.3,
Although the Montana Supreme Court determined that the
wife's voluntary action in quitting her job effectively denied the
father's petition,35 the supreme court held that the wife's voluntary
change in circumstance was of secondary importance because she
was the guardian of the child., The court affirmed the district
court's denial of the father's petition to eliminate his maintenance
payments, holding that a voluntary change alone does not require
termination of maintenance.3
Citing Rome, but not Nelson, the supreme court again failed
to use the good faith test in reaching its decision. 3 Thus, Rome
and Tidball suggest that this omission was intentional. Had the
court applied the good faith test to the mother's acts in Tidball,
the results might have been different; the father's petition may
have been granted if he could have proved that the mother acted
in bad faith.
B. Reasonable Visitation Rights Defined
In Sanderson v. Sanderson"9 the district court originally
awarded child custody to the mother and granted the father "rea-
sonable visitation" rights but did not define the term "reasonable."
The court did not define reasonable because both parents lived in
the same town.40 The mother later took the child to live with her
in Salt Lake City, and the father petitioned the district court to
define what was reasonable. The court treated his petition as a re-
law school and could not earn as much as before. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
father should not be penalized for education decisions made in good faith and not made to
deliberately avoid his child support responsibilities.
32. Tidball, - Mont. -, 625 P.2d at 1148.
33. Id.
34. Id. at , 625 P.2d at 1150.
35. Id.
36. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 1149-50.
37. Id. at -, 625 P.2d at 1150.
38. Id.
39. - Mont. -, 623 P.2d 1388 (1981).
40. Id. at -, 623 P.2d at 1389.
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quest for modification of the dissolution decree and, after applying
the applicable Montana statute,"' found that the petitioner did not
meet the requirements for modification. The petition was therefore
denied.
On appeal the Montana Supreme Court held as error the dis-
trict court's decision to apply modification of dissolution decree
standards to what the court classified as a "clarification.""' Be-
cause it was a "clarification" and not a "modification," the su-
preme court held that the district court should have set up a visi-
tation schedule and should not have applied the stricter
modification standards.'4
As for defining "reasonable visitation" rights, the supreme
court exchanged one vague phrase for another. Such a schedule
should allocate "time for the father's visitation so that a meaning-
ful relationship can be nurtured."
Sanderson requires a district court to first determine whether
a petition to change visitation rights is a clarification or a modifica-
tion before determining whether the new conditions warrant alter-
ing the court decree. A clarification requires the court to draft a




In Rose v. District Court,41 the putative father in a paternity
suit challenged court-ordered blood tests, which help determine
paternity, claiming that the tests were unreasonable searches. 7
The Montana Supreme Court held that blood tests per se were not
41. MCA § 40-4-208 (1981).
42. Sanderson, - Mont. -, 623 P.2d at 1389.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing Rivard v. Rivard, 175 Wash. 2d 415, 451 P.2d 677 (1969)). The Washing-
ton Supreme Court permitted the noncustodial parent to request the district court to spec-
ify reasonable visitation rights when the parents could not agree on a schedule. This distinc-
tion between modification and clarification was offered:
A modification of visitation rights occurs where the visitation rights given to one
of the parties is either extended beyond the scope originally intended or where
these rights are reduced, giving the party less rights than those he originally re-
ceived. A clarification, on the other hand, is merely a definition of the rights which
have already been given and those rights may be completely spelled out if
necessary.
Rivard, 175 Wash. 2d at 417, 451 P.2d at 679.
46. - Mont. -, 628 P.2d 662 (1981).
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unreasonable searches, but in this particular case, the tests did vio-
late constitutional rights because the district court did not follow
proper procedure before ordering the tests. 8 The district court
must first find a prima facie case against the putative father; no
such finding was made, so the action was remanded for an informal
pretrial proceeding on the existence of the prima facie case.4 9 The
supreme court held that the blood tests were generally reasonable
because the tests could conclusively exclude a putative father as
the natural father, which would permit the district court to dismiss
the action against him.50
B. Statute of Limitations
In State v. Wilson," the Montana Supreme Court consoli-
dated two paternity actions, brought by the Social and Rehabilita-
tion Services, that were dismissed because the three-year time
limit 52 had run before either case was filed. The supreme court
held the statute of limitations constitutional when the paternity
action is brought by a state agency but not when brought on the
child's behalf by a representative or guardian."
A child, through a representative, can bring a paternity action
anytime before reaching majority age because the "child is entitled
to support from its father throughout its minority."" The state,
however, cannot bring a paternity action (where there is no pre-
sumed father) three years after the child's birth because:
The State is not a child,. . . it cares not so much about the rela-
tionship of father and child but more about economic reimburse-
ment for welfare and other dependent aid. The rights given to the
State are not equal to the rights and interest of the child or the
reasons or necessity for finding the child's father. The statute of
limitations, therefore, provides a protection against the in-
advertance and delay of the State in actions for paternity. 55
In his dissent, Chief Justice Haswell wrote that the state's pa-
ternity actions should not have been barred because the state and
the child have identical interests.5
48. Id. at -, 628 P.2d at 666.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. - Mont. -, 634 P.2d 172 (1981).
52. MCA § 40-6-108(3) (1981).
53. Wilson, - Mont. -, 634 P.2d at 174.
54. Id.
55. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 174-75.
56. Id. at -, 634 P.2d at 175.
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In Tomaskie v. Tomaskie,17 the Montana Supreme Court
made it clear that the district court must make its own findings of
fact and conclusions of law according to the applicable statutes
and cannot adopt automatically one party's proposed findings. In
Tomaskie, the district court adopted the husband's proposed find-
ings verbatim even though the findings did not comply with Mon-
tana Code Annotated § 40-4-204 (1981). Justice Shea wrote:
It is a wise practice for the trial court to prepare and file its own
findings and conclusions. Only in that fashion can the parties
know that the trial court has carefully considered all the relevant
facts and issues involved .... It is becoming increasingly appar-
ent to this Court, however, that the trial courts rely too heavily
on the proposed findings and conclusions submitted by the win-
ning party. That is wrong! See Canon 19, Canons of Judicial Eth-
ics, 144 Mont. at xxvi-xxvii.58
57. - Mont. -, 625 P.2d 536 (1981).
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